

DISPATCH

SECRET

ECFA-40155

TO Chief, SR  
INFO Chief, ER; Chief of Station, Germany

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM Chief, Frankfurt Operations Base

DATE 17. Sep. 1963

SUBJECT KAPOK REDWOOD REDSKIN ABAEYSS  
Operational Intelligence obtained from ABAEYSS/1

RE "03-3" - (CHECK "T" ONE)

XX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED  
BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCES:

- REFERENCES: A. PROB-5541  
B. EGM-15579  
C. ECFA-40123

1. ABAEYSS/1 was met on 14 August 1963 for a debriefing on his third TDY tour to Salavat from January 1963 to August 1963. The positive intelligence from this debriefing (highlights were cabled to Headquarters in Reference A) is reported in Reference C. A second meeting with A/1 (both meetings were held in the home and in the presence of ABAEYSS/4) was held on 2 September for additional debriefing and final briefing prior to his return to the Soviet Union. On the occasion of the first meeting HERRICOME introduced Herman T. ELLINGHOUGH, alias Peter HENSHL, as an alternate case officer. A/1 was scheduled to depart on 5 September and expects to remain in Salavat until December 1963.

2. Following are the results of our discussion pertaining to operational matters:

a. Identity/A (*Anna Pershova*): A/1 did not succeed in meeting Identity/A as he had planned. While in Moscow in January 1963, on route to Salavat, A/1 talked to Identity/A on the phone asking to meet him. Identity/A begged off citing the excuse that he already had an engagement for the evening. Since the call was made in the early afternoon, A/1 feels that Identity/A could have met him prior to the evening engagement if Identity/A had so desired. Instead, Identity/A dispatched a deputy to the hotel where A/1 was staying to pick up the tapes which A/1 had purchased in Germany as a gift for Identity/A's German tape recorder. A/1 believes that Identity/A, for reasons unknown, was intentionally avoiding a face-to-face meeting with him. (For further information on Identity/A see ECFA-38746, 4 February 1963.)

b. Identity/B (*John*): Identity/B first came to the attention of ABAEYSS/1 on or about 12 June 1963 when A/1 had breakfast in the dining room reserved for foreign technicians, located in the Salavat residence of A/1, on Karl Marx ul. Identity/B had apparently arrived that morning in Salavat from Leningrad and was staying in another part of the same house. He had come down to eat, but was refused service, since the dining room for the technicians was off limits to Soviets. He was noted by A/1 for the noise he made, and the derogatory statements on the fact that foreigners were being served and not Soviet citizens. That same evening, A/1 was walking alone in Salavat when he was met by two Soviets, one of whom was known to him from the construction site. The two Soviets had already been drinking, apparently celebrating a birthday, and when they saw A/1, hooked him under their arms and took him along to the hotel in town which is off limits to the foreign technicians. A/1 reluctantly entered and after they had been seated, Identity/B approached their table and sat down with them. He had already been in the hotel, and had been seated with a man and woman whom he pointed out to A/1 as being with him (possibly from Leningrad). Identity/B immediately began talking in fluent German to A/1, leaving the other two Soviets guessing at what this was all about. He introduced himself, mentioned

GROUP I

Excluded from automatic  
Downgrading and  
Declassification

CLASS DOCUMENT FILED IN 74-6-449/3

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FORM 806  
16 SEP  
1963

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.  
REPLACES FORMS  
01-20, 01-20A AND 01-20B  
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CONTINUED

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B26  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

Identity/E ( ) as his chief, and as the source of his information about A/1. A/1 can only guess that he was identified to Identity/B by other Soviets in the plant area that day. That first meeting was relatively short and consisted mainly of mutual identification. A/1 did invite Identity/B to his room, and the Soviet at first showed some concern: "man wunsent es nicht". He later consented, and visited A/1 a day or so later. At this second meeting Identity/C ( ) was mentioned for the first time. The conversation that evening began with A/1 asking Identity/B about his status in the Soviet Union, referring bluntly to the fact that he is a Jew, and pointed out to the Soviet that this must be registered in his passport. It was then that Identity/B reacted in a way that A/1 assumed him to be not completely satisfied with the Soviet regime. Identity/B remarked that things were now better for the Jews, but he left room for improvement. Then the conversation turned to Germany, at which point Identity/B acknowledged having a friend, Identity/C, who lives close to A/1's home. Identity/B then asked for A/1 to take a letter to Identity/C, and A/1 agreed. The third meeting with Identity/B took place again in A/1's room. The meeting was very short and served primarily the purpose of passing the letter to A/1 (copy attached as S/C Attachment A). At this, or perhaps the previous meeting, A/1 asked for Identity/B's address in Leningrad and hinted at the possibility of coming there for a visit. Identity/B, after some hesitation, wrote down the address on a piece of paper which A/1 offered him (copy attached as S/C Attachment B). Identity/B mentioned that he may have difficulty inviting A/1 to his home. From this statement A/1 concludes that Identity/B is fearful of becoming associated with foreigners. A/1's overall impression of Identity/B was such that he emphatically told the case officer "there is a man who should be of interest to you". A/1 describes Identity/B as follows: about 34 years old, about 1.72 m tall, very skinny, full head of black curly hair, no glasses or beard. From his discussion with Identity/C, A/1 obtained some additional information on Identity/B. A/1 learned that Identity/B's grandfather was the chief rabbi of Moscow. Identity/B himself is divorced, lives in one room and must share a kitchen. A/1 has the impression from Identity/C that Identity/B is very poor. He smokes, and likes American cigarettes (this from A/1 who offered Identity/B both German and American cigarettes in Salavat). He is the chief of a group of six or eight people (presumably engineers) in an office in Leningrad.

CGS: Headquarters traces in ECWA-15579, taken from a debriefing of [ ] are almost certainly identical with Identity/B. The handwriting sample attached to the Headquarters traces definitely is similar to the letter written by Identity/B and given to A/1.

e. Identity/C ( ): On 31 August, A/1 in company of his wife, visited Identity/C at his home to deliver the letter given him by Identity/B. A/1 described Identity/C as about 35 years of age, 6 feet tall, medium build. He was not overly friendly or hospitable. Identity/C lives in a house located immediately adjacent to the village church. It is very old, inherited from Identity/C's parents, and furnished with belongings that obviously had been passed on from a previous generation. The general impression was one of poverty. Identity/C is employed as a teacher in Wolfenbuetel. Also present in the house was a young woman, about 20 years of age, whose name A/1 could not remember. She is dark blond, medium height with pronounced eye teeth. She was introduced as Identity/C's sister. A/1 also remembers seeing a boy, about 8 years, who was not further identified other than "our boy". A/1 does not know whether Identity/C is married, but has the impression that he is not. The conversation with Identity/C revolved mainly about the USSR. Identity/C had visited Leningrad in 1959, 1960 and again this year. On his trips to Leningrad he visits with Identity/B but does not appear to make these trips for this purpose alone. This year Identity/C had already been in Leningrad when A/1 visited him and had been told by Identity/B that a letter was sent to him through A/1. When given the letter, Identity/C passed it to his sister and asked whether it contained anything of interest. She read it quickly and informed Identity/C that it contains nothing special. A/1 did explain that he was delayed in delivering the note, an explanation that was accepted without question. A/1 did not succeed in eliciting information from Identity/C concerning the purpose of Identity/C's trips to the Soviet Union, source of money or activities while in Leningrad. Identity/C showed an interest in the parts of the Soviet Union known to A/1, and much of the conversation consisted of A/1 describing Salavat. Whenever A/1 tried to evoke some reaction from Identity/C on living conditions in the

USSR, Identity/C usually backed off, but occasionally admitted that the Soviets had still a long way to go toward a standard of living on the level of the West. A/1 remarked that this being his first meeting with Identity/C, he could not pump him for information. A/1 came away with the general impression that Identity/C is "the type of shrewd, calculating communist who will take over the Wolfenbuettel area comes the revolution". A/1 invited Identity/C to his home in order to continue the relationship, and to get him under better control for questioning. Identity/C himself hopes to return to the Soviet Union for another visit. On the last visit his sister accompanied him, and from her remarks, she enjoyed it so much that she hopes to go again. No date for such a future visit was indicated.

COMMENT: Upon receipt of residency register office information on Identity/C, we will retrace him citing DPOB, etc. We concur with Headquarters view that the letter exchange may have been a provocation against A/1. We therefore will refrain from any active investigation or liaison traces of Identity/C at this time. We will, however, monitor A/1's future relationship with Identity/C when he returns from the USSR. Concerning the letter in question, we wish to note that it was analyzed by MKTOPAZ revealing no traces of SW or other clandestine communication.

d. Identity/D ( ): Identity/D accompanied A/1 on the train ride from Ufa to Moscow. In order to ascertain the exact location of the two sites observed by A/1 (see Reference C), he enlisted Identity/D's help by betting a cigarette that the train still was a certain number of kilometers from Moscow. Identity/D looked out the window (A/1 standing in the corridor of the train, Identity/D sitting on the window or vice versa) at a kilometer marker they were passing and announced that A/1 was wrong, that they were...kilometers from Moscow. A/1 repeated this stratagem when they were near the other site which A/1 thought to be of interest to us. Identity/D, although known officially to the Western technicians as chief interpreter in Salavat, holds a position of considerable authority, in fact, A/1 believes that he is one of the most influential persons in Salavat. Identity/D now works for the SOVMARKHIZ which is responsible for the Bashkir ASSR. He was born about 1920 in Vladivostok, resides in Ufa. A/1 on one occasion visited Identity/D at home and met his parents. He was once referred to by another Soviet as "major", probably accidentally. From conversation with him, A/1 deduces that he has spent time on the USSR-Chinese border, probably as member of the armed forces. Although A/1 is well aware of Identity/D's role as a watch dog and probable member of the KIS, he has developed a good relationship with him over the years and finds him an effective supporter in his constant battles with Soviet bureaucracy and chicaneries to which he and his fellow Germans are exposed. A/1 believes he was successful in this because Identity/D understands and appreciates A/1's capabilities and also recognizes the shortcomings of those with whom A/1 must deal. A/1 also attributes some of his good relations with Identity/D to the fact that Identity/D has accepted gifts from A/1, particularly clothing. (NOTE: Identity/D has previously been mentioned in EGPA-37447, para 6.d.)

3. For personality data on other Soviets connected with Kombint 18 see S/C Attachment C.

#### 4. Briefing of A/1:

a. Defensive Briefing: Concerning the letter which A/1 delivered to Identity/C we instructed A/1 as follows: It is quite possible that the combination of circumstances, i.e., the close proximity of Identity/C to A/1, the meeting with Identity/D, could all be accidental. However, it would not be prudent to ignore the possibility of provocation; A/1 was told not to accept letters in the future, but to use his failure to deliver the last letter in this as his excuse not to take another letter. He was told that his best defense is a strong rejection of any provocation attempts, and to threaten immediate departure if such should continue. (NOTE: By temperament and inclination, A/1 should be able to carry this out without any difficulty.)

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b. Observations: A/1 was told that we could find no significant targets associated with the sightings he reported. He was requested to check again for any changes, and for any military activity related to these targets.

c. General Reporting: A/1 himself remarked that he now knows what interests us, specifically any missile associated equipment, ION cars, and military hardware. He was encouraged to continue looking for such items.

d. Communications: A/1 was instructed not to write to [ ] anything that could be interpreted as unusual, or intelligence. He was told that we do not expect unusual events in his area of the USSR, and that we could wait until December to learn of anything new.

4. Future Developments: A/1 reported that the Soviets had asked his firm to assign him to either the Ufa or Kazan plants to be constructed. A/1 has not made up his mind what he will do, and does not expect to make a decision until after his long vacation beginning in December 1963. At this time he would prefer to begin construction of the Ufa plant and continue there for about three months or long enough to get things rolling. He would then like to go to Kazan in order to tackle the more difficult assignment there and complete it.

5. Conclusion: A/1 showed definite improvement in his reporting and in his understanding of our requirements. In his use of Identity/D to pinpoint observation targets, and by calling Identity/A, he showed ingenuity and an active interest in complying with our instructions. He accepts minor gifts, such as an occasional carton of cigarettes or a bottle of cognac; he refused, however, to accept compensation for the tapes he purchased on our suggestion for Identity/A's tape recorder, with the explanation that he will charge this bill to his employer as a public relations expenditure. His cooperation with AIS, he insists, is based upon a desire to contain communism.

UAP

APPROVED: [ ]

Attachments, USC:

- A. Copy of letter to Identity/C
- B. Identity/B's handwriting sample, copy
- C. Bio information on other Soviets
- D. Identity List

Distribution:

- 2-SR, w/Attachs. A-D
- 1-EE, w/Attachs. C and D
- 2-COS, w/Attachs. C and D

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CONTINUATION OF  
DISPATCH

~~KAPOK~~  
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.  
Separate Cover Attachment D  
to BEMA-40155

IDENTITY LIST

Identity/A	*GERSHONICH, Frau Giprognostroyzen, Moscow
Identity/B	*ZIRIN, Anatol Leningrad M-135 Franze ul dom 33
Identity/C	*LINDNER, Richard <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Klein-Deutsche ueser Wolfenkuettel
Identity/D	*FRANKOV, Yuri Boris Ufa
Identity/E	*Prof. DUN, Frau

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FORM 53c  
(40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

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SECRET  
NOVA-0155

X  
SISIN, Mikhail Andorovich, CITI USSR

WAS born 1926, Novo-Ivanovka, Bashkirskaya Oblast, USSR.  
Chief of the metalworking plant in Salavat, USSR.  
About 5'10" tall, white build.  
A/1 has almost daily contact with SISIN, but the contact  
is exclusively on technical matters. A/1 still has a  
certain adherence to the party line. When SISIN returned from  
Moscow, A/1 asked how he liked it. SISIN simply told him  
"I liked the Kremlin tower". SISIN has a family, probably no children.  
A/1 was never invited to SISIN's home. He once saw him on the stage of the  
Kulbichansky along with other city dignitaries and concluded from that that  
SISIN is a member of the Salavat city council.. PHYS. DESCRIPTION, BIO. INFO.  
P.S.S.

CENTACT OF C

FORSTENBERG, (FNU) CITI USSR, USSR, SALAVAT

Chief of "Kombinat 13" SALAVAT, USSR.  
About a year ago he replaced DEBESOVITZ, (FNU) who  
was removed for lack of competence. DEBESOVITZ was locally over-  
seen by the FNU and caused constant complaining and it was finally the com-  
bination of DEBESOVITZ (Identity/D) and KUVIKIN, (FNU), the former chief of  
the "Kombinat" now in Moscow allegedly as chief of the "Ant fuer  
Chemie" (FNU), who removed him.

SECRET  
CITI USSR

FORMER CHIEF OF KOMBINAT 13  
SALAVAT, USSR. PROB. REMOVED  
FOR LACK OF COMPETENCE,  
REPLACED BY (FNU) OSSIPENKO.

DESENSITIZED

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74-26-449/3